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The role of the State
and the quality
of the public sector






The author of this article concludes that the quality of the
public sector can be assessed only against the role of the
State. In general, an efficient public sector should be able to
achieve the State’s objectives with the minimum degree of
distortion of the market, with the lowest burden of taxation
on taxpayers, with the smallest number of public employ-
ees, and with the lowest absorption of economic resources
by the public sector. The public sector must be transparent
in its processes and in its outcome. Corruption should have
no part in the decisions made by bureaucrats and political
leaders, and the resources in the hands of the public sector
should be put to a use that maximizes their social rate of
return. The quality of the public sector is also important for
pursuing the objective of equity, which is now seen as one
of the fundamental goals of the State. A high-quality public
sector should make possible the pursuit of equity with the
lowest costs in terms of efficiency. Finally, the so-called “first
generation reforms” do not necessarily improve the quality
of the public sector even though they may improve the qual-
ity of public policy. The pursuit of “first generation reforms”
has, in fact, highlighted the need to improve the quality of
the public sector, and for this to occur, “second generation
reforms” are necessary.
AUGUS  2000
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I
The role of the State
“What is the best government?
That which teaches us
to govern ourselves”
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe
Human beings are social animals, and as a consequence
they tend to aggregate in groups. Aggregation generates
markets and the need for social institutions. Markets and
economic activities are characterized by specialization
on the part of the participants. Specialization leads to
exchanges, and exchanges involve contracts, which may
be implicit or explicit. Implicit contracts prevail in primi-
tive societies and are often enforced by existing moral
and social codes. As societies develop, they require more
explicit or formal contracts. These, in turn, require insti-
tutions to register them, when registration is required,
and to enforce them. In market economies individuals
also accumulate assets and this accumulation leads to
the need for property protection. Furthermore, they need
personal protection against criminal elements within their
groups or against outsiders. Thus, any aggregation of
individuals requires the existence of at least rudimen-
tary institutions that perform these functions and that can
be considered as a minimal form of State. This is the
essential role of the State in a primitive society or its
minimal role in any society.1
As societies become more complex and as the groups
that constitute them become larger and less homoge-
neous, the State must assume additional responsibilities
if it wishes to promote to the full the welfare of the indi-
viduals that comprise it. For example, markets are not
efficient when they are distorted by monopolies or when
essential information is not available to the participants,
or is too costly for them to obtain. This leads to the need
for the State to regulate markets and to provide at least
some essential information to the population. Thus, in-
stitutions must be created to satisfy these needs (World
Bank, 1997).
There are some goods (defence, city streets, etc.)
that only the State can provide because private individu-
als would not find it in their interest to provide them.
One important reason for this is that once these goods
are provided, the provider will not be able to exclude
from their use individuals who do not wish to contribute
to the cost of providing them. Another reason is that once
they are produced, they can be consumed jointly by
everyone, so that it would be inefficient for society as a
whole to exclude some individuals from their use. Con-
sequently, if these goods are essential, they must be pro-
vided (though not necessarily produced) by the State.
These are the “public goods” of economics literature.
Furthermore, the production or consumption of some
goods or activities generates positive or negative exter-
nalities which are not captured by those who consume
or produce them. If the State does not intervene, the
market is likely to under-produce or over-produce these
goods or activities. Once again, there may be a need for
the public sector to intervene.2
All the above are examples of a general role of the
State which, in public economics literature, goes under
the name of resource allocation (see Musgrave, 1959).
This article aims to make a contribution to the literature on sec-
ond generation reforms. A previous version was presented at the con-
ference on second generation reforms organized by the International
Monetary Fund in Washington, D.C., on 8 and 9 November 1999
and another conference on the control of public activities organized
by the Banco di Italia in Perugia on 2 and 3 December 1999. The
author wishes to express his gratitude for the valuable comments
made on a preliminary version of this study by Era Dable-Norris,
Barry Potter and Howell Zee as well as the views expressed by Patricio
Castro, Jerome Fournel, Eduardo Ley, Istvan Székely and other par-
ticipants in an internal seminar of the Fiscal Affairs Department of
the IMF. The views expressed in this article are of course purely
those of the author and should not be interpreted as representing the
official position of the International Monetary Fund.
1
 There is now an extensive literature that argues that even gangs or
criminal associations of individuals require within themselves some
organization that is a rudimentary form of government. See Skaperdas
and Syropoulos (1995), Charap and Harm (forthcoming), and vari-
ous papers in Fiorentini and Zamagni (eds.) (1999). For the concept
of a minimal, or even of an ultraminimal, State see Nozick (1974).
2
 The traditional form of State intervention is to tax those who gen-
erate negative externalities and to subsidize those who generate posi-
tive externalities.
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Although some problems of allocation can be dealt with
by the use of regulations, often, if the State must per-
form this role, it will need resources. In principle, the
State could directly appropriate these resources by forc-
ing individuals to contribute their time or their wealth
for the production of the required goods –as it does, for
example, with compulsory military service or with some
forms of expropriation. In medieval times roads were
often built in this way. However, a more efficient alter-
native is to use resources raised through taxation. Thus,
there is a need for a tax system and for institutions that
collect taxes. And, of course, there is a need for institu-
tions that spend the money and keep track of that spend-
ing. In all these activities, in a market economy the State
is expected to minimize the cost that its activities im-
pose on the market and on society at large. Thus, a pub-
lic sector of high quality requires an efficient tax system
and an expenditure system that minimizes inefficient and
unproductive spending. It also requires a budget large
enough to allow the State to perform its role in a satis-
factory way (see Tanzi and Zee, 1997).
In addition to the essential or fundamental role of
the State associated with the allocation of resources –a
role that has been explicitly recognized and described
by economists at least since Adam Smith’s Wealth of
Nations– two or even three additional economic roles
have been assigned to the State in the present century.
These are i) redistribution of income, ii) stabilization of
economic activity, and iii) promotion of growth and em-
ployment. These latter tasks are less firmly based in eco-
nomic theory than the allocation role, but they have been
important in the practical implementation of policies in
the second half of the twentieth century.3
Markets produce goods and services and provide
incomes to those who participate in them. Depending on
the initial situations of the individuals as regards owner-
ship of real assets, of financial resources, and of human
capital and talent in general, and also depending on their
levels of effort, propensity to save, luck and risk taking,
as well as on government policy, a given pattern of in-
come (and wealth) distribution is determined. This dis-
tribution may or may not match the prevailing societal
perception of the degree of inequality that is considered
acceptable. Furthermore, because of physical or mental
handicaps or other characteristics or situations, such as
old age, unemployment, number of dependents in the
family and so on, some individuals may not be able to
generate an income sufficient to sustain themselves or
their families. In these cases, in the twentieth century
and in some countries, the State has been expected to
provide them with transfers aimed at raising their con-
sumption above a certain essential minimum level.4
The assignment of a redistributive role to the State
has dramatically changed the character of its interven-
tion in the economy because it has introduced into its
actions purely political considerations or objectives. In
fact, while the State’s role in allocation may be defined
(at least in principle) on the basis of technical and objec-
tive analysis, its proper redistributive role cannot be es-
tablished objectively. For example, there is no objective
way to determine the ideal Gini coefficient or the ideal
ratio of the top quintile to the bottom quintile of the in-
come distribution of a country. Thus, these decisions are
unavoidably influenced by the biases of the individuals
constituting the government in power.
Programmes aimed at redistributing income often
require a lot of resources and the presence of institutions
charged with their administration. For this reason, they
tend to lead to large increases in public spending and in
the level of taxation, as they have in the so-called
“Welfare States”.5 At times, the redistribution objective
has been pursued through progressive taxation, but more
often than not it has required large bureaucracies and
much public spending. In many countries a large pro-
portion of the public employees are now engaged in the
provision of public education and health services, and a
large share of the total public spending of industrial coun-
tries goes for social programmes, including pensions. In
some cases public employment has had the specific ob-
jective of redistributing income (see Alesina, Danninger
and Rostagno, 1999).
Markets do not operate perfectly smoothly but are
characterized by fluctuations that sometimes turn into
recessions or even depressions that lead to growing un-
employment and loss of output, and in the second part
of the twentieth century they created another major jus-
tification for State intervention, namely, the maintenance
of full or at least high employment and the stabilization
of output. The promotion of this Keynesian objective is
carried out by government officials and requires some
corresponding institutions. These officials must have the
3 These roles had not affected the behaviour of governments in mar-
ket economies very much until the twentieth century.
4
 In previous centuries religious groups played a similar role in help-
ing the poorest.
5
 The World Bank (1997) has argued that the process of taking over
these new functions has distracted the State from its more funda-
mental role. Schansberg (1996) has argued that redistribution is of-
ten associated with poor policies that harm rather than help the poor.
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capacity to change tax revenue and/or public spending
in order to influence aggregate demand in desirable di-
rections, and they must have the information and the tech-
nical knowledge and wisdom to make the right decisions.
Finally, in recent decades governments have also
promoted policies aimed at raising the rate of growth or
at creating employment. Import substitution and indus-
trial policies are examples of attempts that have been
made to raise the growth rate. Manipulation of the work
week and public investments in particular activities or
regions are examples of attempts at raising employment.
Whatever the wisdom of these policies, special institu-
tions must be responsible for executing them.
We can summarize the role of the State in a market
economy in the following way:
i) it must establish and enforce formal rules in the
economy, including the enforcement of contracts and the
protection of property rights, as well as rules governing
the extraction and use of public revenue;
ii) it must provide a legal and regulatory framework
that reduces transaction costs –that is to say, the cost of
dealing with other individuals in economic matters– and
promotes market efficiency (through strategic market in-
tervention in cases of market failure or through the pro-
duction of some essential information);
iii) it must provide public goods and deal with obvi-
ous cases of externalities which cannot be resolved by
negotiations between the private parties involved;
iv) it must promote macroeconomic stabilization;
and
v) it must promote a distribution of income that is
consistent with the prevailing view of society.
In order to perform these functions, the State needs
some rules and institutions.
The role of the State has changed over time and
across countries (see Van Creveld, 1999), partly because
of the influence of changing or different views about
that role and the evolution of technologies which influ-
ence what the State should do. Therefore, the quality of
the public sector should be assessed in the light of the
objectives and priorities of the government at any given
point in time. These objectives may vary depending on
the current needs of a particular country, and at times
they may even conflict with one another. The State plays
its role through the set of rules, laws, and institutions
that make up the public sector. The higher the quality of
that sector, the easier it will be for the State to play its
role.
The quality of the public sector is defined here as
the characteristic that allows the State to pursue its ob-
jectives in the most efficient way. Although it is difficult
to separate the two concepts, the quality of the public
sector is not necessarily the same thing as the quality of
economic policy. Thus, a distinction must be made be-
tween the quality of the public sector and the quality of
the policies that a given government may be pursuing at
a given moment. A high- quality public sector is simply
the instrument that facilitates the formulation and imple-
mentation of government policies. A good public sector
makes it easier for the government to pursue good poli-
cies, but even a high-quality public sector cannot guar-
antee consistently good economic policies, because it
cannot prevent policymakers from occasionally pursu-
ing poor policies. However, one would hesitate to call a
public sector “high-quality” if poor policies were fre-
quently pursued and one would expect to find a close
relation between the quality of the public sector, as de-
fined here, and the quality of economic policy. In other
words, over time a high-quality public sector is likely to
promote good policies and a low-quality public sector is
likely to promote poor policies.
The definition of a high-quality public sector used
in this paper differs from that of “good government” used
by other writers. For example, La Porta, López-de-
Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) define good govern-
ment as one that is “good for capitalist development”.
They do not distinguish between the quality of the pub-
lic sector and the quality of public policies, yet a poor
public sector will, of course, render the pursuit of good
policies more difficult because it will not provide the
government with the needed information and it will not
guarantee that the policy decisions will not be distorted
in the implementation stage (see, in this respect, Tanzi
(forthcoming)).
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II
The importance of rules
In the previous section the broad categories of State in-
tervention in the economy were described. Each of these
categories requires specific programmes, and each
programme requires a legal mandate. In democracies with
market economies the mandate given to the State for in-
tervention in the economy is often specified, first in the
Constitution and then in numerous laws and regulations
that give a specific content to the normally general prin-
ciples enunciated by the Constitution.6 Thus, the Con-
stitution and the laws and regulations establish the rules
of the game that guide the actions of individuals and
enterprises on the one hand and public institutions on
the other. As North and Weingast (1994, p. 312) have
pointed out, however, “[a] critical political factor is the
degree to which the regime or sovereign is committed to
or bound by these rules.”7
1. The role of constitutions
The principles expressed in the constitution may be clear
but are often not very specific. The constitution must be
a living document that guides action, but it cannot ad-
dress specific situations or anticipate activities or situa-
tions that did not exist when it was written. It has been
reported that Napoleon rejected the draft of the constitu-
tion that the best legal minds of his time had prepared at
his request because he felt that the document was too
specific and thus potentially too restrictive and likely to
become obsolete with the passing of time. He preferred
a statement of general principles that could be interpreted
with some flexibility over time. To a large extent the
American constitution is a good example of such a state-
ment. Only rarely has it required amendments, and the
role of the Supreme Court in interpreting it has never
been challenged.
Examples of constitutional principles that are not
too clear abound. A well known example is Article 81 of
the Italian Constitution, which seems to restrict deficit
financing but, over the years, has been interpreted in ways
that did not prevent the occurrence of large fiscal defi-
cits (see Martino, 1989). Examples of excessively re-
strictive constitutional limits are also common. An im-
portant example of this is the 1988 Brazilian Constitution,
which, in recent years, has prevented the national gov-
ernment from making important and badly needed re-
forms in fiscal federalism and in the pension system.
Other examples are the Indian Constitution, which has
prevented the introduction of a national sales tax, or the
Pakistani Constitution, which has limited the scope of
any sales tax imposed by the national government to
goods only and has prevented the taxation of agricul-
tural incomes (see also Dethier and Shapiro, 1998).
A problem with constitutions is that they tend to
reflect the preoccupations and the political forces of the
time when they are written. A good example of this char-
acteristic is the Italian Constitution which came into force
in 1948. Its first article sets the tone by stating that “Italy
is a democratic republic founded on labour.” It subse-
quently states, in Article 4, that all citizens have a right
to work. In its third chapter (Title III), which specifi-
cally deals with “economic relations”, it lists many rights
of workers but only limitations on the property rights of
individuals, specifying that the State: i) can put limits on
the use of property; ii) can expropriate it for the national
interest, and iii) can impose various limits on the use of
property in order to “establish equitable social relations”.
An Italian author has contrasted this “Republic of the
workers” with the old “Republic of the property own-
ers” (see Rodotá, 1995, p. 352).
These limitations on property rights must be com-
pared with Edmund Burke’s opinion that “a law against
property is a law against industry” or with Adam Smith’s
opinion that “[the] acquisition of valuable and extensive
property ... necessarily requires the establishment of civil
government. Where there is no property ... civil govern-
ment is not so necessary”.8 If the proper economic role
of the State in a market economy requires the protection
of the property rights of individuals, as much recent lit-
erature has argued,9 the Italian Constitution –at least in
6
 For a comprehensive treatment of the role of legal institutions see
Davis and Trebilcock (1999).
7
 Under authoritarian governments or dictatorships the Constitution
may play a marginal role. Stalin’s Constitution for the Soviet Union
was a very good one, but it did not prevent him from doing whatever
he wanted. He was obviously not bound by constitutional limita-
tions.
8
 Both cited in Landes, 1999, on pages 32 and 33 respectively.
9
 See, for example, Landes (1999), North and Thomas (1973), North
and Weingast (1994),and Davis and Trebilcock (1999).
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its formal declarations– seems reluctant to assign that
role to the State. It should therefore not come as a sur-
prise that economic policies and institutions in Italy have
developed in line with the Italian Constitution and have,
at times, allowed policies (rent controls, expropriation
of land with very low compensation, etc.) that are not
consistent with the principle of protection of property.
This may also explain why Italy has one of the lowest
scores, in terms of “economic liberty”, among the coun-
tries assessed by the experts of the Economic Freedom
Network.
In conclusion, the role that constitutions play in de-
termining the quality of the public sector in democratic
market economies cannot be exaggerated.10 It is the
Constitution that encourages or allows certain actions
on the part of the governing body and the citizens. Thus,
at least in principle, the laws and the regulations that
govern a country must be consistent with the constitu-
tional principles as interpreted by the Supreme Court or
by an equivalent body. In recent years, there has been a
trend in many countries to try to modernize their Consti-
tutions. However, the results have not always been very
satisfactory, and at times the revised constitutions have
been poorly drafted, complex and confusing.
Some economists, including James Buchanan and
Francesco Forte, have argued that the economic or fiscal
role of the constitution should be one of establishing lim-
its on governmental action, as is done for example in the
Swiss Constitution. According to these authors, the con-
stitution should stress what the State cannot do rather
than what it should do (see Forte (ed.), 1998). These
authors tend to favour limitations on tax rates, on levels
of public spending, or on fiscal deficits, the objective
obviously being to provide the greatest scope for the
working of the market. The Maastricht Stability and
Growth Pact might be seen as an example of such a limit
in a constitution.
In some circumstances –and again Brazil comes to
mind– a change in the constitution to remove obstacles
to desirable and important reforms may be a necessary
condition for raising the quality of the public sector and
of public policy.
2. Laws
While the constitution sets, or at least should set, the
general principles that guide a country’s policies, the
latter are permitted and directed by specific laws. It could
be argued in general terms that the quality of the public
sector is enhanced when the laws are relatively few, are
clearly written (and thus not subject to conflicting inter-
pretations), are comprehensive, and do not conflict with
each other. Difficulties have arisen when there are too
many laws, they are not clear, and they do not cover all
relevant areas of economic activities, or provide conflict-
ing signals.
It has been reported that while some European coun-
tries have only a few thousand active laws, others have
tens of thousands (see Ferro, Lo Faso and Salvemini,
1999). In such circumstances it may be difficult to find
one’s way in this legal jungle. The legal system may re-
flect a problem conceptually similar to that associated
with the Y2K difficulty. It occurs because every time a
new law is enacted, all the existing laws should be scru-
tinized and, if necessary, revised to make sure that all
the elements in them are consistent with the new law.
This, of course, does not happen. When the existing laws
are very numerous, and especially when they are not
clear, it is almost impossible to ascertain this. Thus, at
some point elements imbedded in laws which were en-
acted in the past but are still on the books may be seen to
conflict with the new laws. When this happens, the di-
rectives to citizens, as well as to the institutions charged
with implementing the programmes contemplated by the
laws, become confused. This problem could be termed
one of legal inconsistency. It often characterizes the re-
lations between national and subnational levels of gov-
ernment, or between, say, pension and health
programmes on one hand and annual budget laws on the
other.11 Zoning laws and laws dealing with the environ-
ment have also suffered from this problem. At times, one
law and a given institution authorize a certain land use
but another law and another institution prohibit this.
These conflicts may lead to costly mistakes and to un-
certainty about property rights, and could negatively af-
fect market decisions.
Thus, to repeat, the quality of the public sector is
enhanced when the laws are written clearly and cover all
the necessary areas, when they do not lead either the
public or public officials to make conflicting interpreta-
10
 This of course assumes that the rule of law is well established in
the country, so that the constitution is taken seriously. It also as-
sumes that effective Supreme Courts exist. In Italy, the “constitu-
tional court” started operating ten years after the approval of the
Constitution (see Rodotá, 1995, p. 353).
11
 For example, the budget law may assign a given budgetary alloca-
tion for the health sector but the laws that determine the performance
of the health sector may call for a higher level of spending. See
Reviglio (1999) for a specific example from Italy.
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tions, when their number is as small as feasible, and when
they do not conflict with each other. Over the years there
have been attempts on the part of some countries (France,
Italy, New Zealand, Russia) either to codify the existing
laws or to simplify them. However, as these actions would
give benefits only over the long run, they do not get much
political support and the attempts are often abandoned
before they produce the necessary results.12
3. Regulations
Laws are often accompanied by specific regulations.13
These can be classified in three groups: economic regu-
lations, safety regulations, and information regulations.
Regulations explain procedures or elaborate on the con-
tent of the laws or simply impose rules on individuals
and enterprises. In some cases the laws are so complex
that they require a very large body of regulations. For
example, the regulations covering the U.S. Internal Rev-
enue Code are reported to cover 18,000 pages, while the
Internal Revenue Code itself is some 2,300 pages long.
Regulations issued by an executive authority or by a regu-
latory agency can themselves be very complex, may not
be easily accessible by the public, and may overlap with
other regulations. In some countries they may not even
be published.14 Yet, as a recent OECD report states:
“Regulation is perhaps the most pervasive form of State
intervention in economic activity” (OECD, 1999, p. 179).
Because many forms of regulations do not require
budgetary appropriations or formal approval by the leg-
islature, they tend to be less scrutinized. Thus, there is
often an oversupply of regulations and their interpreta-
tion is all too often left to the bureaucrats who adminis-
ter them. Therefore, the possibility of confusion or even
abuse is very high. Regulations have been identified by
the literature on this subject as one of the major causes
of corruption, because the bureaucrats in charge may
abuse them for their personal gain (see Tanzi, 1998b).
They have also been shown to impose very large welfare
costs on the economy.15
Because of the dynamic character of economies, and
because of fast technological change, it is common to
find countries with too many anachronistic, useless or
even damaging regulations and too few necessary regu-
lations relating to new economic activities.16 This is an
area where excess and scarcity often coexist. Many coun-
tries are now struggling to create needed regulations for
the financial and banking sectors, for the use of the in-
formation superhighway (Internet), for genetic research,
for the use of some drugs, and for several other impor-
tant new areas.
To sum up, a high-quality public sector must have
enough clear rules to guide economic (and other) activi-
ties, but not rules that are so numerous or so vague as to
give excessive power to bureaucrats or to create uncer-
tainty among those who make economic decisions. In
general, the rules should specify what is not allowed
rather than authorize what is allowed. Discretion by bu-
reaucrats should whenever possible be kept to a mini-
mum. It has been reported that there are countries where
some routine activities such as a request for a tax incen-
tive or an application to open a small enterprise may need
30 or 40 authorizations signed by public employees in
as many agencies or offices (see, inter alia, De Soto,
1987). This cannot be consistent with a high-quality pub-
lic sector or with an efficient market.
An important step would be to make a periodic in-
ventory (say, every ten years) of all the existing regula-
tions, so that a “regulatory budget” could be established
and could be pruned of redundant and anachronistic regu-
lations while complementing it with new required ones
and clarifying the confusing ones. Such an attempt has
been made, with mixed results, by a few countries in-
cluding Hungary and Argentina. Such a process, while
costly, would raise the overall quality of the public sec-
tor. Another useful step would be the creation of a one-
stop, or “single window” centre where individuals can
obtain all the permits and authorizations they need for
their activities. Such centres have been created in a few
places and are reported to have led to the elimination of
many existing regulations and a reduction in corruption.17
12
 See, for example, Guy (1996), Braibant (1996), Mattarella (1994),
Smith and Richardson (1999) and Tan and Tower (1992).
13
 Regulations may be legislated and thus be laws themselves, or
they may simply be issued by public agencies.
14
 In a country in which I worked many years ago tax incentives
regulations were not publicly available in any form. Thus, the bu-
reaucrats making the decisions had all the knowledge and their deci-
sions could not be challenged by the taxpayers. These cases of asym-
metric information between the State and citizens are not uncommon.
15
 See United States Congress, Senate Committee on the Budget
(1984); Dixit (1996); Laffont and Tirole (1993); FIEL (1988); OECD
(1999), and Jacobs (1999).
16
 A couple of years ago, it was reported in the American press that
in California, bread had to be sold only in pieces of an exact, well
specified weight. This regulation, which was still on the books, had
been introduced at the beginning of the century when most buyers
did not have scales, so that they could be easily cheated by unscru-
pulous bakers. In Italy and Germany discounts on sales by shops
must be approved by the municipality and must be limited in time.
17
 Centres of this type now exist in Bologna (Italy) and in Salvador
de Bahía (Brazil). In Bologna an attempt is being made to allow
access to this one-stop centre through the Internet.
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In addition to the formal constitutional rules and the
rules specified in the laws and regulations, the quality of
the public sector may be affected by informal norms or
arrangements that influence the economic behaviour of
individuals and the behaviour of the public sector. Such
norms i) influence the choice of presidents, ministers,
and other high-level officials; ii) set the pattern of ap-
pointments in the civil service, and iii) influence con-
tacts between the State and the private sector.18 These
informal norms may be based on religious, social or po-
litical considerations. Since they are of an informal na-
ture and are based on cultural characteristics, they are
difficult to change. Even so, the application of arms-
length relationships and the rule of law in all aspects of
public sector behaviour should be a goal in the search
for a higher-quality public sector (see Tanzi, 1995).
III
Political and procedural rules
The constitution, the laws and the regulations establish
the broad legal powers of the public sector; or, to put it
differently, they set the rules of the game that should
determine the behaviour of the public sector and the regu-
lation of the market. The importance of these rules can-
not be overestimated. Several authors, including
Buchanan, Alesina, von Hagen, Poterba, Tabellini and
Persson, have argued that political arrangements such as
fiscal federalism and fiscal decentralization, proportional
or non-proportional representation in parliaments, the
frequency of elections, the choice of presidential versus
non-presidential types of governments, the role of the
ministry of finance as a super-ministry, the rules that
apply to the budgetary process (for example, whether it
starts with a macroeconomic constraint which reflects a
collective view on priorities or whether it allows pres-
sures for spending to be determined through the politi-
cal influence of each minister), whether parliament can
modify the content of budgetary proposals or must vote
on the whole budget, whether the central bank is inde-
pendent, and so on have a significant impact on fiscal
and macroeconomic outcomes.19 These situations have
been modelled using strong assumptions and sophisti-
cated game theories and have subsequently been sub-
jected to empirical testing (see, among others, Tabellini
and Persson (forthcoming) and Poterba and von Hagen
(eds.), 1999).
I will not review this literature, which is still evolv-
ing and which, at times, has come to conflicting conclu-
sions. While recognizing its importance and its potential
contribution to explaining economic policy, the focus in
the present paper is on other aspects and, specifically,
on the quality of the public institutions. Political and pro-
cedural rules are more likely to affect policies than the
quality of the public sector or of public institutions. It is
the institutions that confront the citizens and implement
the policies. But, of course, by changing the incentives
under which policy-makers and institutions operate, the
political and procedural rules may affect the behaviour
and thus the quality of the institutions, and vice versa.
The rules are just a set of instructions. They are not yet
the policies. Until the game is played, these rules remain
just pieces of paper, and the game is played by the insti-
tutions charged with carrying out these instructions,20
which may or may not carry out the instructions in a
faithful and efficient way.21 The public sector is com-
posed of many institutions, some more important than
the others. It is the performance and efficiency of these
institutions which, to a large extent, determine the qual-
ity of the public sector.
18 In some countries high public positions are almost inherited. Some
jobs in particular institutions are passed from one member of a fam-
ily to another. In others, party affiliation facilitates access to govern-
ment jobs and a change in government creates a large number of
vacancies because many jobs are considered as political appoint-
ments.
19
 Ricardo Haussmann has argued in support of a politically inde-
pendent Fiscal Council that would restrict annual public debt accu-
mulation to agreed levels. The analogy with the idea of an indepen-
dent central bank is obvious. Others have argued in favour of a fiscal
policy that to some extent is insulated from political pressures (see,
for example, Blinder (1997) and Kopits and Symansky (1998)).
20
 It can be argued that there are two sets of games taking place. The
first is the one that sets the rules and the second is the one that imple-
ments them.
21 In a recent paper I argued that public policy is often distorted by
the existence of principal-agent problems (see Tanzi (forthcoming)).
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IV
The quality of public institutions
The quality of the public sector may be affected by the
absence of some essential institutions or by the poor
performance of the existing institutions. For example, in
many countries there are no institutions responsible for
enforcing competition, for forcing full disclosure on the
part of financial institutions or for obliging enterprises
whose shares are traded on the stock market to present
proper accounts. As a consequence, the market may func-
tion less well because of cronyism and monopoly pow-
ers or because of lack of essential information. The per-
formance of public institutions depends on many factors
including i) tradition and reputation; ii) the resources they
have available and the discretion over their use; iii) the
clarity of their mandate; iv) their organization; v) the
incentives they are given; vi) the quality of their leader-
ship and staff, and vii) the freedom they have in terms of
reorganization.
Let us take one of the most fundamental institutions
as an example: namely, the tax administration. Its per-
formance will depend in part on its tradition and reputa-
tion. A tax administration which has been efficient, hon-
est, and proud of its work in the past is likely to continue
to be so in the future unless it suffers truly fundamental
shocks. By the same token, it is very difficult in the short
run to change a corrupt and inefficient administration.22
Its performance will also depend on the resources that it
has available for hiring capable employees and paying
good salaries, investing in new computer technology,
carrying out necessary audits and so on. The clarity of
its mandate –for example, to enforce the tax laws fairly
and objectively– is also important, while its day-to-day
independence from political pressures is essential. When
the mandate becomes unclear, either because the laws
are not transparent or because the institution is subjected
to political interference that forces it to accommodate to
the special circumstances of some taxpayers, problems
develop. This has been the case, for example, in some
transition economies and some developing countries,23
where political interference has reduced the quality of
the tax administration. The organization of the tax ad-
ministration is also important, as is the set of incentives
that it is given. If an institution is poorly organized, or if
good or bad performances are equally rewarded, the con-
tribution of that institution to the quality of the public
sector will be low.24
Attempts are currently being made to strengthen the
incentives for good tax administration by making such
administrations politically independent, like the central
banks,25 and by negotiating explicit contracts between
the government and the tax administration that require
quantitatively specified levels of performance. In Aus-
tralia, for example, the government guarantees the tax
administration a given level of resources over a three-
year-period, and in return the tax administration under-
takes to deliver certain quantifiable results and outputs.26
This brings us to two other important and related
aspects of public institutions, namely i) the synergy
among public institutions, and ii) the enforcement mecha-
nisms. These are treated here as two separate aspects,
although to a large extent they are two faces of the same
coin.
1. Synergy
Like different elements of an ecological system, public
institutions work together and support one another, so
that it may not be possible to have, say, a first-class tax
administration in an environment where other institu-
tions, such as the treasury or other important ministries,
the judiciary, or even the post office do not function
well.27 Often the same weaknesses affect different insti-
tutions, so that attempting to improve just one institu-
tion, when the others need equal attention, is not likely
to generate the desired results in the long run. This has
22
 Occasionally countries have opted to close down unsatisfactory
offices or departments and open new ones, thus starting again from
scratch.
23
 See for example Tanzi, 1998a.
24
 The rules on hiring, promotion, firing and other matters relating
to public servants obviously also play an important role in determin-
ing the quality of the public sector.
25
 Thus, the tax administration is given greater discretion in the use
of resources.
26
 The cost of collection may be of importance in this context. See,
for example, Highfield (1999).
27
 For example, in countries where tax evaders are not punished by
the courts, it will be more difficult for a tax administration to fight
tax evasion. In countries where the mail does not operate well, it
will be difficult for the tax administration to rely on it to contact
taxpayers and vice versa.
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been the experience in transition economies where, for
example, the establishment of a good treasury system
has not improved the quality of public expenditure man-
agement much because the budgetary process has con-
tinued to generate budgets that are so unrealistic that no
treasury could finance or manage them. In some of these
cases the result has been the accumulation of arrears on
the part of the government, matched by a similar accu-
mulation of arrears by taxpayers (see Potter and Dia-
mond, 1999).
Inter-institutional externalities (either positive or
negative) are very important and must be recognized and
dealt with in any attempt at improving the quality of the
public sector, although unfortunately, as far as I know
this aspect has not been addressed in the literature. For
example, when the judiciary does not work well, many
other institutions suffer. The same could be said of the
educational system. A holistic approach that simulta-
neously addresses problems in different institutions is
likely to be necessary. However, such an approach, which
is inevitably difficult to follow, must be guided by a clear
strategy and by the proper sequencing of the changes
required and made. If this approach requires more time
to implement than the political horizon of the govern-
ment that introduces it, it is less likely that it will be
fully implemented. This is the reason why the quality of
the public sector changes only slowly over time.
2. Enforcement mechanisms
The quality of the public sector will depend to a consid-
erable extent on the existence of controls and enforce-
ment mechanisms. Some of these mechanisms must op-
erate within the institutions themselves. For example,
efficient internal auditors’ offices can improve the func-
tioning of the institutions and provide some guarantees
that the latter will not stray away from their basic man-
date. But these mechanisms may not be sufficient. In
other cases the enforcement mechanisms must cut across
institutions, as occurs when top-level audit institutions
specializing in controls and enforcement have responsi-
bility for controlling spending and revenue collection.
These institutions often draw their mandate from the
constitution itself and act as independent bodies.
Examples of such top-level audit institutions are the
General Accounting Office (GAO) in the United States,
the Cour des Comptes in France, the Corte dei Conti in
Italy, the Comptroller-General’s Office in many Latin
American countries, and so on. Historically, these audit
institutions have focused too much on whether the insti-
tutions have complied with the letter of the law rather
than its spirit. Thus, in many cases they have paid less
attention to the performance of the institutions in terms
of outputs and outcomes than to the question of whether
they have complied with legalistic requirements. This
kind of auditing is of limited value, except, perhaps, for
ensuring accountability, because it does not promote the
quality of the public sector in its fundamental objective
of serving the public. It does not guarantee that the pub-
lic is getting value for the money spent by the public
sector.
In recent years there has been a movement to focus
on performance and output, rather than on formalities
and on input. This movement tries to assess public spend-
ing in terms of its economy, efficiency and effectiveness.
It requires quantitative indicators of public performance
and of the cost of public sector activities. It has had its
strongest expression in New Zealand and Australia, but
it has also been spreading to other countries in modified
forms.28 It has brought with it many changes in contrac-
tual arrangements and in the organization of public in-
stitutions. For example, in the countries that have adopted
it, civil service jobs no longer carry lifetime tenure and
many constraints on the actions of those who run de-
partments have been removed. The government, as the
principal, now makes contracts with a public agency on
what the latter must deliver, and the head of that agency
becomes personally responsible for the outcome. If the
agreed goals are not met, the contracts of the heads of
the agencies are not renewed or their salaries are reduced.
Thus strong economic incentives are being linked to per-
formance. The final impact of these changes in coun-
tries whose cultures are very different from those of
Australia and New Zealand remains to be assessed.29 It
would be hard to implement these changes, for example,
in countries where it is difficult to fire workers, almost
regardless of their performance. It is easy to see the con-
flict between this approach and the spirit of the Italian
Constitution.
28
 While the Australian system initially focused on the outcomes of
public spending, the New Zealand system has always concentrated
on the measurable output. It should be clear that outputs and out-
comes are not the same thing. Outcomes may be more difficult to
measure and may be affected by public spending, but with long lags.
For example, educational spending may be assessed in terms of stu-
dents in school (an output) or in terms of growth in human capital
(an outcome). Health spending may be assessed in terms of opera-
tions performed or in terms of impact on the length and the quality
of life. Obviously, the goal of the government should be to influence
outcomes, but these are more difficult to measure than outputs.
29
 For a skeptical assessment of these changes, see Schick (1998).
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This discussion of enforcement mechanisms and
controls would not be complete without a reference to
two fundamental points.30 The first is the weakness of
the cash accounting approach, which has traditionally
been used for the measurement of government opera-
tions, as a means of securing good efficiency controls.
The second is the measurement of consumer reactions
and preferences with respect to the services rendered by
public agencies, which has only recently begun to be
studied. Before addressing these two points, it is impor-
tant to mention that any concept of the quality of gov-
ernment services must be related to the cost of those ser-
vices and to the resources available for generating them.
The greater the resources available, the better one should
expect the public services to be. For a given level of avail-
able resources, however, the higher the efficiency of the
public agency, the higher will be the quality of the ser-
vices provided.
The first question, then, is how to measure the level
of resources used. Traditionally, the fiscal accounts (and
hence the budget) have relied on cash accounting or cash
transactions. Thus, the cost of, say, agency X is mea-
sured by the cash transfer that agency X receives from
the budget. However, accounts based on cash transac-
tions have many weaknesses which are now more fully
recognized by accountants and economists. The need for
accrual accounting is now well established, at least, in
principle, although practical difficulties in its use are
likely to delay for some time the transition from cash
accounting.31 Accrual accounting measures much more
accurately the true costs of public sector activities, and
it would thus make possible audits that are more mean-
ingful in comparing outcomes with true costs. For ex-
ample, cash accounting ignores the opportunity cost of
using public sector assets if this use does not result in
cash transfers (see Tanzi and Prakash (forthcoming)).
Thus, an activity that receives only small cash transfers
but uses very valuable land or buildings is now assessed
as having low costs, which is obviously wrong.
The second question relates to the role of citizens,
as taxpayers and consumers of public services, in evalu-
ating the latter. Most of the reforms to date –particularly
those agency-based reforms that distinguish between
principal (the government) and agent (the public agen-
cies)– represent actual or implicit contracts between two
producer interests. An example from the private sector
might be a contract between a regulatory body for the
private sector and the monopoly industry it regulates.
The regulatory body is supposed to represent the con-
sumer in some sense, but its direct role is basically to
avoid excessive profits for the producer rather than to
specifically protect consumer interests. What is missing
in the administrative arrangements in Australia and New
Zealand is the voice of the consumer. Unlike the private
sector, where consumers can state their preferences di-
rectly (providing there is an adequate degree of compe-
tition within the market), this possibility does not exist
in public services. Therefore, some reforms in the 1990s
have been aimed at trying to find surrogate indicators of
consumer preferences. At least three approaches are
worth mentioning in this respect:
i) Some evaluation studies have canvassed the views
of particular consumers, not in relation to an organized
consumer survey, but as part of a wider exercise aimed
at finding out, for example, parents’ views on the educa-
tion given to their children. Such exercises have tended
to be partial and confined to individual sectors.
ii) Another approach has been based on formal con-
sumer surveys that may cover a number of different ser-
vices. The World Bank and individual countries or insti-
tutions have carried out some initiatives in this area.32
While this does represent an advance on the past, the
limitations of this approach are also significant. First, it
is essentially opinion-related rather than measuring some
actions or providing specific responses by the consumer
to quality concerns. Second, it is subject to the usual
problem that a well-designed survey can produce more
positive views than might really be justified of services
provided by the public sector.
iii) These weaknesses in both evaluations and con-
sumer survey-type approaches led the United Kingdom
in the early 1990s to seek an alternative approach. From
this emerged the “Citizens’ Charter”, which tries to in-
volve the citizens in the setting of standards. This has
been done in a number of ways. Citizens’ representa-
tives or other consumer interest groups are also involved
in the setting of standards and performance contracts
between the government and agencies, not just the min-
istry of finance. Moreover, having set standards, con-
sumers are also given the right and means to complain,
through the provision of telephone hot lines, etc. Con-
sumer response is taken into account when assessing the
30
 I am grateful to Barry Potter for calling my attention to these two
points.
31
 The Department of Statistics of the IMF is in the process of pro-
ducing a new manual of government finance statistics based on ac-
crual accounting.
32
 For example, users of public hospitals have been asked to assess
the quality of the services provided, or taxpayers have been asked
their opinions on some aspects of tax administration.
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overall performance of an agency manager. The com-
pulsory use of name badges for officials –so that con-
sumers can identify them and send in responses that re-
ward good service and punish bad attention– is a small
but significant element. This is still another example of
how incentives are slowly being introduced in the public
sector. Furthermore, in certain cases consumers are en-
titled to some form of compensation, if the public ser-
vice provider fails to meet the required standards. The
simplest example is that season ticket holders on certain
rail services are entitled to refunds if delays in the run-
ning of the trains exceed a certain limit.
None of these approaches is wholly satisfactory, but
at all events the inclusion of consumers’ views in setting
standards and commenting upon their compliance or oth-
erwise, and thus influencing the future allocation of pub-
lic sector resources, is likely to become a major theme
over the next few years. It is also likely that incentives
and penalties will play an increasing role in promoting a
higher quality public sector.
In addition to the internal controls and those per-
formed by auditing institutions such as the GAO or
the Cour des Comptes, there are some other institu-
tions whose work and efficiency are an essential in-
gredient in the quality of the whole public sector.
Among these the system of justice is of the greatest
importance. The role of the justice system in all its
manifestations in enforcing contracts, in protecting
property rights, in ensuring the safety of individuals,
in keeping corruption under control, and in improv-
ing the efficiency of other institutions is fundamen-
tal. Thus, it is no exaggeration to say that the quality
of the public sector of a country and the functioning
of its market depend significantly on the performance
of its justice system. It is for this reason that the sys-
tem of justice is receiving a lot of attention in many
countries, including European countries such as
France, Italy and Portugal and the majority of Latin
American countries.
In many countries the system of justice has been in
crisis in recent years. Individual and property rights are
not protected, contracts are not enforced, processes take
years or even decades to be concluded, and so on. In
many cases individuals who break the law are not pun-
ished, are punished only lightly, or are not punished un-
til much later, when the deterrent effect of the punish-
ment is lost. In some countries, the slow-moving or even
corrupt system of justice has provided an implicit incen-
tive for tax evasion, corruption and other illegal activi-
ties, because those caught committing crimes can count
on the inefficiency or corruptibility of the justice system
in order to escape punishment. In some countries it takes
ten years for the government to determine whether some-
one accused of tax evasion should really pay the taxes
claimed or not. Furthermore, often the penalties imposed
are insignificant. This is a good example of the cross-
institutional externalities mentioned earlier. The same
may occur in the case of those who do not comply with
the terms of contracts. For example, the proliferation of
bad loans and of financial crises is in part a direct conse-
quence of the excessively low and much-delayed penalties
on those who do not comply with the terms of their con-
tracts.33 In some countries apartments or houses are left
empty, rather than being rented out, because of the diffi-
culty that the owners would have in reclaiming them at the
end of the contract. The failure of the justice system clearly
encourages tenants to ignore the terms of their contracts,
and imposes efficiency costs on society as a whole.
When justice is corrupt or inefficient, it also becomes
unjust, because some people are more adroit at taking
advantage of its weak points. Law-abiding citizens are
the ones who end up paying a higher price, and eco-
nomic activity suffers. Equal access to justice –and to
justice that is administered in a timely fashion– must re-
main one of the fundamental goals of the State. It is also
one of the main requirements for an efficient market. If
this goal is not met the quality of the public sector will
remain poor (see Guigou, 1999).
33
 In many countries bankruptcy has become almost a trivial matter,
of little consequence. The establishment of suitable bankruptcy laws
has therefore become an important issue in such cases.
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V
Measuring the general quality of the public sector
Although knowledgeable individuals may have an a
priori idea of the general quality of the public sector of a
given country, it would be difficult or even impossible to
make objective measurements of that quality. In prin-
ciple, one could conduct surveys of perceptions of such
quality, using the same techniques adopted, for example,
in surveys of corruption. In order to obtain acceptable
results, however, the informational requirements on the
part of the respondents would be extremely high, so that
the quality of the responses would tend to be low. It might
be easier to evaluate the quality of each of the major
institutions that make up the public sector and somehow
weigh their importance for the general quality of the
public sector. However, given the number of such insti-
tutions and the knowledge required to assess them, such
an exercise would also be very costly and would not nec-
essarily achieve the desired results. An alternative way
would be to simply measure the economic and social
performance of a country, focussing on the output or,
better, on the outcome and attributing the results obtained
to the quality of the public sector. However, this approach
would also have its limitations.
In recent years some institutions and scholars have
begun to focus on particular features that capture some
significant aspects of the quality of public sectors. The
IMF, for example, has been focussing on types of statis-
tics that countries could produce and make available to
the public. Some of these data relate to the public sector.
The assumption would be that countries that are willing
and able to generate good public sector data and make
them available on a timely basis to the public have a
higher quality public sector.34 The Fund has also started
to assess the transparency of fiscal policy and fiscal in-
stitutions in the light of a set of general principles of
fiscal transparency. The assumption is that lack of trans-
parency is an indication of lower quality of the public
sector and that this lack of transparency promotes ineffi-
ciency, poor policies, and various problems of gover-
nance. In time, transparency reports could be available
for most countries. If they were comparable and com-
prehensive, these reports would serve as proxies for in-
formal assessments of the quality of the public sector.
In recent years, a lot of attention has been paid to
issues of governance and corruption in public institu-
tions. These issues also bear on the quality of the public
sector. It has been recognized that lack of transparency
in the way institutions operate and lack of controls pro-
mote inefficiency and corruption. There is now a large
literature on transparency and on corruption. Australia
and New Zealand have once again led the way in pro-
moting techniques aimed at increasing transparency. In
the new “architecture” of the international financial sys-
tem, it is recommended that countries should become
more transparent in their policy-making. More transpar-
ency would probably mean less corruption and gener-
ally a higher-quality and better-performing public sec-
tor. However, much needs to be learned about these
relationships. It must also be recognized that tests of
transparency may be either superficial or deep. Superfi-
cial tests would not be very useful for understanding what
is going on in a public sector, while deep tests might
require a large amount of highly specialized and costly
resources.
Corruption is certainly a sign of a low-quality pub-
lic sector. Various groups have been preparing corrup-
tion indexes for a large number of countries (see Tanzi,
1998b). These indexes claim to measure “perceptions”
of corruption. It is likely that to some extent, and assum-
ing that the perceptions reflect reality, these indexes of
corruption can also be taken as proxies for the quality of
the public sector. However, caution is needed because,
quite apart from the quality of the corruption indexes, a
country could have a totally honest bureaucracy or po-
litical leadership but very inefficient policies and insti-
tutions. Although important, corruption is only one as-
pect of poor public sector quality.
Some authors, such as Rauch and Evans (forthcom-
ing), have provided estimates of bureaucratic perfor-
mance for many developing countries, thus providing
measures of yet another variable that has a bearing on
the quality of the public sector. Keefer and Knack (1997),
for their part, after defining institutional quality as “ob-
jective evaluations ... of the institutions that protect prop-
erty and contractual rights”, attempt a measurement based
34
 The data themselves might tell more about the quality of public
policy than the quality of the public sector.
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on several indicators, but it is not clear to what extent
these measure the quality of public sector institutions.
There are also other variables that may provide in-
formation on the quality of the public sector. Some re-
late to its efficiency, some to the policies followed. For
example, the relationship between spending in a given
category –say health and education– and the outcome of
that spending –such as lives saved, successful operations,
reduction in the incidence of certain diseases, educational
achievements– would be an indication of efficiency (see
Gupta, Honjo and Verhoeven, 1997). On the other hand,
measurements of fiscal sustainability might be indica-




The quality of the public sector can only be assessed
against the background of the role of the State. If the
public sector allows the State to promote its goals in an
efficient and successful way, it can be argued that the
public sector is of high quality. However, the goals must
be realistic because even a very efficient public sector
will be unable to fulfill unrealistic goals. Thus, in gen-
eral the quality of the public sector cannot be measured
by the quality of the policy outcome, although the two
are obviously closely linked, especially over the long
run.
In general, an efficient public sector should be able
to achieve the State’s objectives with the minimum de-
gree of distortion of the market, with the lowest burden
of taxation on taxpayers, with the smallest number of
public employees, and with the lowest absorption of eco-
nomic resources by the public sector. The public sector
must be transparent in its processes and in its outcome.
Corruption should have no part in the decisions made by
bureaucrats and political leaders, while the resources in
the hands of the public sector should be used in a way
that maximizes their social rate of return. Such a public
sector would be clearly “market augmenting”, to use a
now fashionable expression, and it would pay particular
attention to the protection of property rights and the en-
forcement of contracts.
The quality of the public sector is also important in
the pursuit of equity, which is now seen as one of the
fundamental goals of the State. A public sector which
facilitates the pursuit of equity in all its aspects must,
ceteris paribus, be deemed of higher quality than one
that does not do so. However, as argued earlier, it is dif-
ficult to determine the optimal role of the State in this
area, and it is easy to see how some policies that redis-
tribute income can have disincentive effects. These ef-
fects are more likely to arise when the public sector is of
low quality and thus makes it easier for policies to be
distorted during the implementation stage (see, for ex-
ample, Alesina, Danninger and Rostagno, 1999, and
Schansberg, 1996). A high quality public sector should
make possible the pursuit of equity at the lowest cost in
terms of efficiency.35
Finally, the discussion in this paper should have
made it clear that the so-called “first generation reforms”
which have been so popular in many countries in the
1980s and 1990s do not necessarily improve the quality
of the public sector, even though they may improve the
quality of public policy. The pursuit of “first generation
reforms” has, in fact, highlighted the need to improve
the quality of the public sector, and for this to occur,
“second generation reforms” are necessary.
(Original: English)
35
 An important role in this area has been assigned to the State by
Sen (1999), who identifies development with freedom and who as-
signs to the State the function of providing access to education and
health for all. A high-quality public sector would facilitate the
achievement of Sen’s objective.
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